Back News said: “The judgments maintain the initial 2014 “suspension agreements” in which the refined/gross blend of sugar imports from Mexico was 53%/47%, the polarity for “other” sugars was 99.5 and the reference prices for refined sugar were 26c per pound and 22.25c for raw sugar. The 2017 changes had adjusted the refined/gross import mix to 30%/70%, lowered the polarity of “other” sugars to 99.2 (hence, 99.2 polarity and above was classified as refined sugar in the changes) and raised the reference prices to 28c for refined sugar and 23c for raw sugar. In 2014, the United States and Mexico agreed, at the request of the American Sugar Alliance, to a suspension agreement that aimed to reduce Mexican sugar prices and thus jeopardize the competitiveness of U.S. sugar companies. In his press release, Husch Blackwell, led by Washington partner Jeffrey Neeley, said he had put in place “a legal strategy that called into question the inability of the Department of Commerce to record information about meetings that have ex-shared discussions with other members of the domestic industry and trade officials, including Minister Wilbur Ross. In the end, the CIT agreed and found that Commerce had broken the law with respect to the agreement. As a result, the Tribunal found that the trade decision had been overturned and that the revised agreement with Mexico was non-hazard. The stay means that the United States and Mexico must end the amendment and return to the 2014 agreement. Mexico`s sugar quota: Mexico`s pre-NAFTA U.S. sugar quota was about 8,000 tonnes of gross value. This quota reflected Mexico`s status as a net importer of sugar. While Mexico`s sugar production was around 3.2 million tonnes, the growth in sugar consumption exceeded that of sugar production, which meant that Mexico had a relatively large demand for sugar imports. About 35% of U.S.
sugar imports and about 8% of total U.S. sugar supply are generally imported from Mexico. The quantity varies depending on U.S. sugar production and demand. The 2014 agreements provide for a review every five years, as the A.A. O.C had previously announced that it would begin in December of this year, when results were not expected for several months. NAFTA was designed to remove most of the trade barriers between the United States, Canada and Mexico over a 15-year period. The original agreement did not include the U.S.-Canada sugar trade, as this issue was covered by the 1989 U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. A few years after the contract was signed, Mexico became a net surplus producer, threatened by the increasing use of HFCS SYSTÈMES imported into Mexico. Mexico asserted that the United States had dumped in the years following the signing of the HFCS “accessory” agreement.
Since 1998, Mexico has also complained about its U.S. tariff quota and Mexican officials (who believe the U.S. sugar market has not opened fast enough) have called for better access. Domestic producers in the United States oppose Mexico`s assertions. Some Mexican officials have denied that they have already signed the famous NAFTA “incidental agreement”; no others. At the 1998 International Sweetener Symposium, the head of NAFTA`s Mexican office in Washington, D.C., called for a renegotiation of the provisions established by the subsidiary agreement after 2000. According to him, Mexico should be allowed to send all its future surplus production to the United States and not the 250,000 tonnes agreed in the treaty. After the agreement came into effect, U.S. refineries said they did not use enough sugar to operate.
U.S. and Mexican officials returned to the negotiating table and arrived with an agreement that U.S. officials, ranchers and refineries said, brought stability to the market and that the Sweetener Users Association said led to high prices.